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~he

purpose of this study was to examine whether closedmindedness

is related to decision-making behaviors.
in this study were:

The decision-making variables

Pieces of Information, Decision Change, Decision

Confidence, Decision Accuracy and, post hoc, Decision Appropriateness.
The measures of decision-making behaviors were obtained from four decision
situations developed by the experimenter.

Closedmindedness was assessed

using Rokeach's (1960) Dogmatism (D) scale.
Persons with high D-scores tended to arrive at decisions on the
basis of less information than persons with low D-scores (r
and to make more appropriate use of information (r

l

-.22, p < .05)

= +. 40,

p < • 01) , yet

=

+.06, p > .05)

they showed no tendency to differ in either accuracy (r

i

=

or confidence (r

=

-.18, p> .05).

Furthermore, they showed no tendency

to be less able to reverse an earlier decision (r

=

+.04, p>. .05).

Two interpretations, one in terms of intelligence and one in terms
of dogmatism, are presented •
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Individual differences are readily apparent not only in the quality
-,t•

of a decision but also in decision-making behaviors.

Variations in

--decision-making behaviors are attributab+e, at least in part, to the
individual's emotional make-up and the relationship of the emotional
make-up to the individual's cognitive structure.

Frenkel-Brunswick

(1949) is prominent among the many who have pointed to this relationship
between personality and cognitive variables.

She found that variations

in parental behavior result in yariations in the child's ability to
tolerate ambiguity.

According to Vacchiano et al. (1969), later studies

have supported this view.
One personality dimension that has been linked widely with cognitive functioning is dogmatism, or closedmindedness.

Rokeach (1954)

defines closedmindedness "(a) a relatively closed cognitive organisation
of beliefs and disbeliefs about reality, (b) organized around a central
set of beliefs about absolute authority which in turn, (c) provides a
framework for patterns of intolerance toward others" (p. 195).
measure of closedmindedness is dogmatism (D-scale).

Rokeach's

Allport (1947)

observed, many years ago, that whether or not facts are ignored or falsified is the result of both intellectual and emotional forces existing
in the individual.

Ignoring or falsifying facts on the basis of value

structures present in the individual has the potential effect of warding

i

I,
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off threats from reality (Allport, 1947).

At the same time, according

to Maslow (1954), it gives the individual the feeling of understanding
reality.

Thus, closedmindedness has come to be seen as a cognitive

defense mechanism.

One would expect· it to discriminate individual

decision-making behaviors.
This study focuses on two pre-decisional and two post-decisional
aspects of decision-making behavior.

The pre-decisional behaviors meas-

ured are Pieces of Information Sought and Decision Change.

The post-

decisional behaviors examined are Decision Confidence and Decision
Accuracy.
making.

!

Several studies have examined these aspects of decision(See Table ·1 for a sunrrnary comparison of selected findings.).

Pruitt (1961) specifically focused on how many pieces of information

!
•

!·

were requested by an individual prior to making a decision.

His subjects

were asked to decide whether a red or a green light was more likely to
flash.

Information consisted of a sequence of flashes of these lights.

Under one condition, a subject could make this decision only once per
sequence, whereas under another condition, prior to seeing any lights,
an initial

decisio~

changed once.

had to be made, but this decision could later be

Using the expected-value model of decision-making, Pruitt

calculated the expected value for both conditions, which was assumed to
represent a rational strategy for making a decision.

..

The results he

obtained indicated that more information was needed to change a decision
than to make an initial decision.

He was able to discriminate readily

among his subjects with respect to the number of pieces of information
they required.

~owever,

he did not link these differences to any person-

ality variables.
Feger (1978) also discriminated reliably among subjects on the basis

3

of their choice of pre-decisional stopping points (p. 336).

Again,

this finding was not linked to any personality variables.
Long and Ziller (1965) did link pre-decisional information search
to closedmindedness, specifically, to Rokeach's D-scale.

They theorized,

as did Rokeach (1960), that high D-scale individuals would be closed to
new information.

The expected negative relationship between D-scale

and Pieces of Information Sought was found for each of the tasks, the
Pearson product-moment correlation coeff.icients being - . 20, - . 24, - • 28,
0.32 (see Table 1).

The sample Long and Ziller studied consisted of 79

first-year college women at the University of Delaware.
different tasks:

There were four

a ."Word Completion Task," a "Line Judgment Task,"

a "Concept Formation Task" and a "Withholding Opinion Scale."

Long and

Ziller (1965) concluded:
The negative relationship between Rokeach's Dogmatism scale and
the four decision measures supports the initial hypothesis and
indicates that in decision-making situations the non-dogmatic
person tends to delay decision or reserve judgment, and to
search for and utilize additional information. (p. 377)
In a presentation to the 80th Annual American Psychological Association·-convention, Taylor (1972) -reported results which suggested that
high D-scale individuals tend to be more confident of their decisions
and to make more accurate decisions.

Taylor was not able to obtain a

significant negative correlation between closedmindedness D-scale and
either Amount of Information or Decision Flexibility.

His 79 subjects

represented a wide range of line management levels from foremen to factory
managers, and decision-making behaviors were assessed via the Personnel
Decision Simulation (PDS) scale, which requires the subject to make a
promotion decision.

This instrument yields scores for, inter alia:

4

Amount of Information, Decision Accuracy, Decision Confidence and
Decision Flexibility.

Correlation coefficients were obtained for

and each of the above-listed variables.
r

= +.27

For Decision Confidence an

was obtained, for Decision Accuracy the ..E.

lations significant at the .05 level.

D~scale

= +.23,

both corre-

The Amount of Information/D-scale

correlation of -.17 as well as the Decision Flexibility/D-scale correlation of -.10 were found to be in the expected direction, but were not
significant •
In a later study, Taylor and Dunnette (1974) again obtained nonsignificant
t~on

~egative

correlations between D-scale and Amount of Informa-

and between D-scale and Decision Flexibility, the direction in both

cases being negative.

The subjects and the design of this study were

I

I

I!

essentially the same as in the earlier study conducted by Taylor in 1972.

!

The Personnel Decision Simulation instrument yielded scores for Amount

I

i.

of Information which correlated with D-scale -.16,
Accuracy +.23,

.E..

< .05; Decision Confidence +.27,

.E..
.E..

> .05; Decision

< .05; Decision

Flexibility -.09, .E. > .05 (see Table 1).
The findings reported thus far fail to give clear support to the
existence of a relationship between closedmindedness and any of the
variables under examination.

Though all correlations between closed-

mindedness and Amount of Information have been negative, none since the
Long and Ziller study bas been significant.

It is hoped that the present

study will clarify this relationship and also those between D-scale,
Decision Change, Decision Confidence and Decision Accuracy.
Several measures of open- and closedmindedness have been proposed:
Rokeach's Dogmatism (D-scale), Korn and Giddan's Dogmatism (P-scale),

/
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and Wilson and Patterson's Conservatism (C-scale).

Rokeach's (1956)

D-scale is designed to measure "the extent to which a person can receive,
evaluate and act on relevant information on its own intrinsic merits,
unencumbered by irrelevant factors in the situation arising from within
the person or from the outside" (p. 57).

Rokeach (1960, pp. 89-90)

reported reliability figures for D-scale that ranged from .68 to .93
for time intervals of from one to six months.
five-year test/re-test follow-up study,
of .55.

Ehrlich (1961), in a

~eported

reliability coefficients

A later study by Zagona and Zurchner (1965) essentially substan-

tiated Rokeach's and Ehrlich's earlier findings.
Several researchers have undertaken validity studies of the
D-scale.

Plant (1960), in a replication of Rokeach's own concurrent

validation study, substantiated Rokeach's findings that the D-scale was
less loaded with ethnocentrism than the Authoritarianism F-scale and
therefore constituted a better measure than the F-scale.

Vacchiano,

Schiffman and Strauss (1967) performed three independent factor analyses
6t·the D-scale items and found that the scale contained several factors
and could not be reduced to one dimension.

(Unfortunately, it was not

possible to examine these factors separately in the present study because
the method of scoring was not reported.)

The analysis of items produced

factors that "tended to group around Rokeach's theoretical definition"
(p. 847).

The authors reported nine significant .factors, some of the strongest
among those being:

Factor I, which consisted of those items that reflected

the subjects' strong desire for group cohesiveness and intolerance of the
deviant; Factor II, which consisted of items that indicated the subjects'

6

negative assessment of people who hold beliefs contrary to their own;
Factor III, whose items reflected importance attributed to a mission or
great cause in life; and Factor V, which was composed of items that
addressed the subjects' insecurity and anxiety over inadequacy and
dependence on authority (pp. 849-51).

Reliability figures for these

factors were not provided by the authors.

Their sample consisted of

88 women and 87 men.
Korn and Giddan (1964), in another construct validity study, examined the relationship between the D-scale and several of the California
Psychological Inventory scales.

The results confirmed the negative

correlations with Flexibility, Tolerance and Well-Being which were
predicted by Rokeach's broad definition of what the D-scale measures.
White and Alter (1966) reported norms for the D-scale, based upon
37 samples from various populations.

They found generally wide variations

in means, which led them to caution that the D-scale might be highly
sensitive to subcultural differences, particularly since the most extreme
means were found in non-college student samples.

In addition, Alter and

White (1966), Korn and Giddan (1964), and Vacchiano, Schiffman and
Strauss (1967) found that women scored consistently lower than men.
The most consistent criticism brought against the D-scale addresses
the issue of an agreement response set.

Several researchers (Couch &

Keniston, 1960; Lichtenstein, Quinn & Hover, 1961; Peabody, 1961, 1966)
found that at least some agreement component entered into D-scale performance.

Korn and Giddan (1964), who based their study on Peabody's (1961)

concepts, showed that most of the variance accounted for by the total
score could be accounted for by the direction of the response.

They
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suggested the use of what they called "P-score," rather than Rokeach's
composite score.

The "P" stands for "Proportion" and is defined as

"The mean extremeness in the positive direction" (p. 868).

The P-score

merely gives the frequency of agree responses whereas the composite
score reflects the intensity, as well as the direction, of the response
to an item.

The P-score was found to account for 90 percent of the

variance in the composite score.

The authors had expected that a

person who generally gives an extreme agreement response (high dogmatic),
would choose a moderate or low disagreement response whenever he or she
would not agree with an item.

This should then have resulted in a

negative relationship between dichotomous extreme responses (p. 870).
Their results, however, failed to support this hypothesis, and instead
indicated that a person who indicates agreement with D-scale items in
an extreme manner also tends to indicate disagreement in an extreme
manner.

The authors interpret this finding to indicate the operation

of an extremeness response set. (p. 870).

They continue to reason that

"since P is a good approximation of f_ and eliminates a possible extremeness response set, we shall now use the P score . . . " (p. 871).

For

the purposes of the present study, both a composite score and an agreement (P) score were determined.
In 1968, Wilson and Patterson (1968), in answer to the response set
problems encountered by agreement scales such as the D-scale, developed
a Conservatism scale (C-scale).

The C-scale was designed to differ from

other scales in that "the basic formula 'X is a good/bad thing' (agree
or disagree) is substituted by the simple formula, 'X' (good or bad)"
(p. 50).

Wilson and Patterson (1968) hypothesized, "Because the item

8

is reduced to attitude content or referent alone, we might expect
that contamination due to context (grammatical confusion, ambiguity,
task conflict, acquiescence, etc.) will be brought to a minimum" (p. 50).
They claim that the scale is predominantly uni-dimensional.

Relia-

bility figures from several studies (Nias, et al., 1971; Wilson &
Patterson, 1969; Schneider & Minkmar, 1972 as cited by Wilson & Patterson,
1973) give coefficients that range from .89 to .94.

Construct validity,

the authors indicated, is partially established in that their theoretical
expectation that conservatism increases with age and is slightly
higher with females was supported by their data.

(In contrast, women

were found to score consistently lower on the D-scale.)

"Known group"

validation studies (Wilson & Patterson, 1968; Wilson & Lillie, 1972,
as cited by Wilson, 1973) have shown the e·xtreme group
scores to be satisfactorily separated on the test.

Concurrent validity

was measured by correlating C-scale scores with the California F-scale
(.!'_

= +.6~)

and Rokeach's D-scale (.!:_

=

.39.)

The normative information provided by Wilson and Patterson (1968)
shows great variation in means between different groups of people, with
university students on the lower end of conservatism and parents of
university students and housewives on the upper end.

It should be

noted that reliability, validity, and normative figures for this scale
are based on studies conducted in Great Britain, The Netherlands, West
Germany, New Zealand and the United States.
The C-scale will be used in the present study, in addition to
Rokeach's D-scale, although it is recognized that different theoretical
bases exist for these measures.

9

The four major hypotheses under examination in the present study
are based upon the earlier cited research ·findings provided by Long
and Ziller (1965), Pruitt (1961), Taylor (1972) and Taylor and Dunnette
(1974), as well as the theoretical positions adopted by Rokeach (1960)
and retained in somewhat altered form by Janis and Mann (1977).
Hypothesis I postulates that Closedmindedness as a cognitive defense
mechanism results in the more closedminded person's use of fewer Pieces
of Information.
Hypothesis II, in accordance with theoretical (Rokeach, 1960; Wilson,
1973) and empirical (Ehrlich & Lee, 1969; White & Alter, 1965) findings,
postulates that Decision Flexibility or Decision Change, measured by
the number of times a preliminary decision is changed prior to the final
decision, correlates negatively with high scores on the D-scale.
Hypothesis III deals with the individual's confidence estimate of the
probability of correctness of the final decision.

Studies by Taylor

(1972) and Taylor and Dunnette (1974) show that persons scoring high on
the D-scale tend to be more confident of the correctness of the decisions
they have made.

It is therefore expected that D-score correlates posi-

tively with Decision Confidence.
Hypothesis IV concerns Decision Accuracy.

Taylor & Dunnette (1974)

found some indication that D-score correlates positively with Decision

.·

Accuracy.

A tentative hypothesis will be made that D-score correlates

positively with Decision Accuracy.

CHAPTER II
METHODS
Subjects
A total of 38 women and 35 men participated in this study.
All were students recruited from sociology,. criminal justice, and psychology
classes at the connnunity college and university levels.

Ages ranged

from 15 to 49 years, with a mean of 25 years (see Table 3).

The partici-

pation of subjects in this study had been approved by the Human Subjects
Committee at Portland State University.
Procedure

!l .

Each subject was issued a numbered folder which contained, in this
order:

twq personality measures,

.-seoires -.ea1Mi~,..P~aale-.-s1Qe.res

t~e

Dogmatism Scale (from which D-scale

would be computed) and the Conservatism

Scale

(C-scale); one· ·sheet· containing written instructions for the decision
situations and providing space for the subjects to record their age and
sex; decision situation F; and finally, in a randomized order, the remaining three decision situations, B, C, F and S.
Before the subjects opened the folders, the experimenter made a
statement which covered the following points:
-The entire experiment consists of six parts.
-Please complete part one and two and then wait for additional
verbal instructions before you proceed.
-Do not change the order in which the tasks appear in front of you.
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-Each of you will be working on different decision situations
with different solutions.
-During the time that you are working on decision situation F,
which is the first decision situation for each of you, you may
ask questions regarding the procedure for completing that task.
-After you have completed decision situation F and have proceeded
to the next decision situation, it will be assumed that you know
what to do, and the experimenter

~ill

no longer be able to answer

questions.
-Please read all the instructions carefully and follow them in a
step-by-step fashion.
The participants first completed the D-scale form E, which conl

sisted of 40 statements (e.g., "It is only natural for a person to be
rather fearful of the future.")

Subjects were asked to indicate agreement

or disagreement with each statement along a +3 to -3 scale with no zero
point.

These scores were later converted into a 1 to 7 scale by adding

a constant of 4 to each score.
and 7 with no 4.

This makes possible scores 1, 2, 3, 5, 6,

This scoring method was developed by Rokeach and is

suggested for use in the test's manual.

Scores can range from 40 to 280

with a high score indicative of a high degree of dogmatism.

Because several

subjects who had participated in a pilot study for this experiment had
expressed

strong negative reactions to the 1960s "sexist" wording

of some of the items, it was decided to change the word "man," wherever
it was used to refer to both men and women, to "person."
item 37:

For example,

"A man who does not believe in some great cause has not really

lived," was changed to read:

"A person who does not believe in some

. -- . - -- ·1
12
great cause has not really lived."

(For a complete list of the changed

items see Appendix B).
As indicated earlier, Dogmatism P-scores were obtained as well.
Secondly, subjects completed the 50-item C-scale developed by Wilson and
Patterson (1968).

Items consisted of one or two words (e.g., "birth

control") to which the subject was to say "Yes," "?" or "No."

Of the

50 items, the odd numbered items require "Yes" responses, to be scored
as indicators of conservatism and the

eve~

numbered items require "No"

responses to be scored as indicators of conservatism.
are brief and in written form at the

to~

Instructions

of the single-page instrument.

A liberal response was scored as zero; an ambiguous (?) response, as l;
and a conservative response as 2.

Scores can range from 0 to 100, with

the higher scores indicative of conservatism.
Thirdly, subjects proceeded to a coversheet asking them to provide
demographic information such as Age and Sex.
instructions pertain-ing to the decision tasks.

This was followed by written
(For detail see Appendix A) •

Each situation began with a description of the setting, for example,
"You are a buyer for a large department store.

• ." (See Appendix A).

Two conditions are developed in the subsequent "story."

Each condition

represents a set of given odds such as "the manufacturer produces a
slightly defective shoe •

about 20% of the time.

facturer produces such a shoe about 40% of the time."

The other manuThe "story"

then sets the scene for the prospective decision-maker to have an opportunity to look at a given number of randomly selected samples prior to
making the decision.

A cost factor is associated with looking at each

additional sample (piece of information).

Three samples are available
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at the outset.

From then on samples can be obtained by removing small

round labels one at a time up to a total of ten.
The "story" then brings the subject to the point where it must
be decided whether the samples available for inspection up to this
point are likely to represent the "20% or 40% defective shipment."
cost factor is associated with decision accuracy as well.

A

Gains and

losses are balanced in each situation.
As noted, each subject has the opp9rtunity at the beginning of
each decision section, to make a decision on the basis of three pieces
of information which are provided "free of cost."

If, for example, an

acceptable shoe is represented by the symbol "+" and an unacceptable shoe
by the symbol

"+ + -."

11

-,

11

this initial information might be represented as

The subject is then asked Question 1, whether the three

samples are more likely to have come from the 20% or the 40% defective
shipment?

This decision is followed by the request to indicate on a

scale with a probability range .5 (uncertain) to 1.00 (completely certain),
how certain he or she is about the decision just made.

Question 2 asks

the subject to decide whether he or she wants more information.

If so,

a box can be checked which indicates that the above decision constitutes
a preliminary decision and the subject is directed to inspect the next
sample which up to now has

be~n

covered by a small round label.

The removal

of this label makes a total of four samples available for inspection,
e.g., "+ + - +."

Question 3 asks the subject whether the decision he

or she made is a final decision, and applies only to subjects who do not
want additional information.

The subject, by checking a box,

in~icates

that the decision made on question 1 represents a final decision and is
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subsequently directed to go on to the next decision situation.
Questions 1, 2, and 3 are repeated for each additional piece of
information the subject uncovers.

After ten pieces of information,

a subject can still indicate a further need for information by checking
an appropriate box; however, no additional information can actually be
requested or obtained.

The maximum number of pieces of information any

one subject could obtain in all four situations is 40.
The time subjects used to complete. all of the tasks ranged from
35 to 65 minutes.
Pieces of Information refers to the number of pieces of information
requested by the subject prior to making a final decision.

Decision

Change indicates how many times a subject changed his or her decision
prior to coming to a final decision.

Decision Confidence reflects how

certain the subject said he or she was about the accuracy of the decision
just made.

And Decision Accuracy reflects the correctness or incorrect-

ness of the subject's final choice.
These variables were measured via four decision situations developed
by the experimenter.

All four situations were designed after the book-

bag-and-pokerchip paradigm of Edwards (1969).

In this paradigm, a subject

might be told that there are two bags each containing some blue and some
red pokerchips.

In one bag the ratio of blue to red chips is 7 to 3;
,·

in the other bag the ratio is 3 to 7.

Several chips are randomly drawn

from one of the two bags, and the subject decides, based upon this information from which bag these chips came.

This paradigm permits the calcu-

lation of probabilities associated with each piece of information given
to or requested by a subject.

It also permits the calculation of the

15
appropriateness of a decision given the information the subject has obtained.
The basic book-bag-and-pokerchip structure was imbedded into
simulated "real life" situations to give the otherwise somewhat artificial

i.

task a more realistic flavor.

In addition, each situation was written

to include a potential pay-off or loss to the subject.
done to increase realism and subject involvement.

Again, this was

(See Appendix A for

complete descriptions of each of the four decision situations.)
Design
Each of the four
Information.

situati~ns

was designed to contain ten Pieces of

Information sequences were generated randomly for each of

the 74 subjects in each of the four situations, so that statistically
significant results could be generalized across both sequences and subjects.
Of the four decision situations, Situation F was the first one each
subject completed.

The presentation order for the three remaining decision

situations was randomized •
...~~.e .. .f.ollowing criteria were used in determining whether the data

generated by any given subject should be included in the final data
analysis:
-Answers to all 40 questions on the Dogmatism scale, Form E,
must have been clearly indicated by the subject.

A maximum of

two missing responses was permitted on the questionnaire.
The experimenter calculated the subjects' average i tern response
and used the resulting values to replace the missing responses
when only one or two were missing.

None of the subjects had to

be eliminated on the basis of this criterion alone.
-The Conservatism scale must have been completed, and the answers
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clearly marked.

In their test manual, the authors of this

measure made provisions for missing responses.

In accordance with

this method, the constant 1 was entered for each missing response.
No subjects were eliminated on the basis of this criterion.
-No more than five missing values for either age or sex were to be
accepted.

Three subjects neglected to indicate their age, in

which case the age value was not included in the analysis for these
subjects, but all other data for these subjects were included in
the analysis.

All subjects had indicated their gender.

,•

-Each subject must have worked through each of the four decision
situations in accordance with the written and verbal instructions

..

L

given.

Subjects who failed to do so on any section of these

tasks were excluded from the data analysis.

A total of 15 subjects

had to be excluded because they failed to meet this criterion.

.l·

I

i

•l

CHAPTER III
RESULTS
This section is divided into two parts.

Part 1 contains correlations

between predictor and criterion variables pertaining to the major hypotheses.
Part 2 contains secondary distributional

~nd

correlational information on

the predictor variables and distributional and correlational information
on the criterion variables.
Part 1:

,Relationships between Predictor and Criterion variables
~e

data were subjected to a correlational analysis.

predictor variable was the D-score.

The P- and C-scores were examined

only for their consistency with the D-score.
were also used as

predictors.

The major

In addition, Age and Sex

The criterion variables were the decision-

making variables Pieces of Infonnation Sought, Decision Change, Decision
Confidence and Decision Accuracy.

Each hypothesis was tested at the .05

level, using a non-directional test.
The major tests of the hypotheses and their results (also presented
in Table 2) are as follows:
Across situations, the D-score correlated negatively with Pieces
of Information(.£= -.22, .E_< .05, df - 72), but did not correlate with
Decision Change(_£= +.04, E_>.05, df = 72), Confidence(_£= -.18, E_>.05,
df = 72) or Accuracy (.£ = +.06, E_> .05, df = 72).

The "across-situations"

score for each of the four criterion variables Pieces of Information,
Decision Change, Confidence and Accuracy was obtained by summing each of

l.
I
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the four criterion variable scores for each subject over the four situations.
The following sections will examine these findings in detail.
Pieces of Information.

According to Hypothesis I, a negative corre-

lation between D-score and Pieces of Information was expected.

To protect

against an adverse finding, an alternate hypothesis that there is a positive correlation between D-score and Pieces of Information was considered.
Consequently, the statistical hypothesis was that there is no correlation
__ between D-score and Pieces of Information.

The level of confidence was

set at .05.
The experimental hypothesis was supported by.the data.

The correla-

tion of -.22 between D-score and Pieces of Information across situations was
weak but statistically significant (.E_ < • 05, df

=

72).

Correlations for the

individual decision situations F, C, B and S were in the same direction
but only one of them was significant:
df

=

72; situation C:

_!:. =

Situation F:

r = -.03, .E_> .OS,

-.19, .E_> .05, df = 72; situation B:

.E_>·.os, df = 72; and situation S:

.!:. = -.29, .E_ < .05, df

=

72.

_!:. =

-.17,

A t-test

f 9_!' the difference among dependent correlations showed no significant
difierences between correlations in the four situations.
The Dogmatism P-score (agreement score) when correlated with Pieces
of Information across situations yielded no significant relationship

.<.!:.

=

-.17, .E_ >.OS, df = 72).

Individual situations showed a statistically

significant correlation
between the P-score and Pieces of Information in
I
the hypothesized directions only for situation·S (_!:.= -.24, .E_<.05, df = 72).
The correlations for situations F, C and B, all non-significant, were
+.04,-.16, and -.18 respectively.
No hypothesis had been stated regarding the relationship of C-score
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and Pieces of Information.

The data analysis revealed no relationship

between these two variables, the r
Decision Change.

= +.01

across situations.

Hypothesis I I predicted that Opinion Change

(indicating how many times a person changed his or her opinion prior to
the final decision) correlates negatively with D-scale scores.

To pro-

tect against an adverse finding, an alternate hypothesis that there is a
positive correlation between D-score and Decision Change was considered.
Consequently, the statistical hypothesis was that there is no correlation
between D-score and Decision Change.

The level of confidence was set at .05.

The data did not support the experimental hypothesis.
situation correlation·coefficient was r

=

+.04 (£.> .05, df

=

The across-

72).

Coeffi-

cients for the individual decision situations, as well, were non-significant,
(see Table 2).

The same pattern·revealed itself for the correlations with

the .P-score and the C-score.
Decision Confidence.

Hypothesis III stated that persons with high

D-scale scores will express greater· confidence about the correctness of
the decision they have made.

Again, an alternate hypothesis was that

there is a negative correlation between D-score and Decision Confidence.
Consequently, the statistical hypothesis was that there is no correlation
between D-score and Decision Confidence.

The level of confidence was set

at • 05.
The across-situation correlation of -.18 between the D-score and
Confidence was not significant.

For situation S, the D-score/Confidence

correlation was -.29 (£.< .01, df

= 72).

For all other decision·situations,

the D-score failed to correlate significantly with Confidence (see Table 2).
Contrary to this hypothesis, however, P-score correlations with
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Confidence were r = -.24 (.E_< .05, df = 72) aeross situations and for
situation S the r = -.35 (.E_< .01, df = 72).

The correlations for situ-

ations F, C and B were in the same direction but not significant (see
Table 2).
The C-score did not correlate significantly with confidence in
any of the four situations or with the across-situation measure of confidence, which had an!:.= -.15 (E_> .05, df = 72) (see Table 2).
Decision Accuracy.

Hypothesis IV

~entatively

relationship between D-score and Decision Accuracy.

postulated a positive

An alternate hypothesis

was•thatthere is a negative correlation between D-score and Decision
Accuracy.

Consequently, the statistical hypothesis was that there is no

correlation between D-score and Decision Accuracy.

The level of confidence

was set at .05.
The results of the data
hypothesis.

~nalysis

did not support the experimental

D-score and Decision Accuracy had an!:.= +.06 (.E_> .05, df = 72)

across situations.

The same nonsignificant pattern occurred for the

individual situations (see Table 2).
The P-score and across-situations Accuracy had an._£= +.01 (E_> .05,
df

=

72), and again the individual situations showed no relationship

(see Table 2).
The C-score did not correlate with Accuracy on either the acrosssituation measure (!:_

= +.16,

.E_> .05, df = 72) or any of the individual

situations (see Table 2).
A test of the difference between related correlations indicated no
significant differences among the four situations with respect to the
relationships between D-score and Pieces of Information, Decision Change,
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Confidence, or Accuracy (see Table 3).
Sex and Age.

The predictor variables Sex and Age correlated with

none of the decision-making behaviors under examination {see Table 2).
Part 2:

Predictor and Criterion variables considered separately
The decision-making variables Pieces of Information, Decision

Change, Decision Confidence and Decision Accuracy were also examined.
Of the six possible across-situation correlations only that between

~ieces

of Information and Decision Change was sta.tistically significant (r

=

--:!':t"'

.E. < • 01, df

=

72).

+. 38,

Those who requested more information changed their

decisions more frequently.
The criterion variables Pieces of Information, Decision Change,
Confidence and Accuracy were also examined.

For each of the variables

Pieces of Information, Decision Change, Confidence and Accuracy all six
possible pairwise correlations between the measures in one of the four
situations and that in another were examined.

For Pieces of Information

these correlation coefficients ranged from +.28 to +.75 and were significant, with the exception of the correlation coefficient +.08 between situations F and S (see Table 4).

For Decision Confidence these correlation

coefficients ranged from +.28 to +.60 and were significant (see Table 4).
For both Pieces of Information and Decision Confidence these results were
to be expected.

,·

For Decision Change these correlations showed little consistency
in either extent or direction.

No~e

was found to be significant (see

Table 4).

For Accuracy these correlations were all non-significant (see

Table 4).

The latter two variables, it should be noted, depended upon the

individual sequences experimental design which provided for each subject
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individually generated information samples, and non-significant intercorrelation coefficients could therefore be expected.
Since the experimental design called for sequences of pieces of
information that were generated individually for each subject from a random
numbers table

~ccording

to a predetermined probability which changed from

decision situation to decision situation, a secondary predictor variable
emerged from the data analysis.
Diagnosticity variable.

This variable will be referred to

~s

The term Diagnos.ticity, as used by Edward9

(1969) in his book-bag-and-pokerchip experiments equals the sample frequency of the more frequent color (red or blue) in the population minus
the sample frequency of the less frequent color in the population.

In

this experiment the term is used identically, as a measure of the extent
to which the information favors the correct or the incorrect decision.
A Diagnosticity value is thus obtained by taking the number of pieces of
information in favor of the correct decision and subtracting from it the
number of pieces of information in favor of the incorrect decision.

Across

situations Diagnosticity correlated significantly +. 37 (£. < • 01, df = 72)
~Lth

Accuracy.

Correlations between Accuracy and Diagnosticity varied

from situation to situation.
(£. < • 01, df = 72);

+. 61

and +. 72 (.E_ < • 001, df

=

Situation F, C, B and S correlated +.34

(.E_ < • 001, df = 72);

+. 71

(.E_ < • 001, df = 72);

72) respectively (see Table 5).
'

Criterion variable distributive information.
sought 3.1 (SD= 1.82, N
situation.

=

74) pieces of info.rmation of a possible 7 per

For situation F the mean was 3.73 (SD= 2.66, N = 74); situation C:

2.23 (SD = 1.91, N = 74) situation B:
situation S:

On the average subjects

3.20 (SD= 2.59, N

2.37 (SD

= 2.22, N = 74) and

= 74) (see Table 6).
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Thirty-two percent of the subjects did not change their decision
at all, 26% of the subjects changed their decision once and 24% of the subjects changed their decision twice which yields a cumulative frequency
of 82% of subjects who changed their decision zero, one or two times of
a possible 32 times across situations.

The average decision change per

situation was 1.47 times (SD= 1.48, N = 74) (see Table 6).

At-test

for differences between independent means showed no statistically signifi-cant (!_ = • 21::. .E. > • 05, df = 72) difference. between the D-scores of
subjects who changed their decision at least once and between those
subjects who made no decision changes in any of the four situations.
On the average, subjects indicated their Confidence level to be
I

i
..

between .84 and .89 in each situation (see Table 3).

".50" indicated

complete uncertainty and "1. 00" complete certainty.
Eighty-eight percent of all subjects made two or more of the four
decisions correctly.
decision.

In situation F:

In situation C:

77% of the subjects made the correct

61%; in situation B:

76%; and in situation S:

45%.
Correlations among Predictor variables.

Correlations between the

predictor variables D-score, P-score and C-score as well as Age and Sex
were obtained.
The correlation between ,the D- and P-score was +. 94 (£. < • 001, df = 72),
between the D- and C-score +. 22 (£. < • 05, df

=

72) and the P- and C-score

+.18 (£. < • 05, df = 72) (see Table 7) •
Neither Age nor Sex correlated with the D-score, the P-score or
the C-score (see Table 7).
Distribution information pertaining to the predictor variables Dand P-score, the C-score as well as Age and Sex is listed in Table 6.

CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
Of the four hypotheses, only Hypothesis I, which predicted a
negative relationship between D-score and Pieces of Information, was
supported by the across-situations analysis (.£ = -.22, .E. < .05, df

=

72).

No support was found for Hypothesis II, that D-score correlates negatively with Decision Change, measured by how many times or whether or
not a person changed his or her mind prior to making a final decision,
nor for Hypothesis III, that D-score correlates positvely with confidence about the correctness of decisions.

In fact, the across-situation

correlation coefficient between D-score and Confidence, -.18 though
non-significant, leaned toward a negative relationship, rather than the
expected positive relationship.

Finally, Hypothesis IV, which postulated

a positive relationship between D-score and Accuracy and found no
support.
Hypothesis I
The hypothesized negative relationship between D-score and Pieces
of Information was obtained a~ross situations.
although weak (-.22, .E. < .05, df

=

This relationship,

72) was statistically significant.

Long and Ziller's (1965) findings show the same negative relationship
between D-score and Pieces of Information (see Table 7).

Taylor's (1972)

results confirmed the ngative direction but, with an.£= -.16 (.E. > .05,
df = 77), failed to be statistically significant.

The same results were
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obtained when Taylor and Dunnette (1974) repeated the Taylor (1972) study
in a slightly modified form (see Table 6).
The pattern of the

D-score/Piece~

of Information correlations is

consistent in all of the studies examined.

Although the correlations are

not always statistically significant, the consistanti.direction of'.these
correlations, taken by itself, does lend support to Rokeach's theoretical
contention that closedmindedness as a general
entiates persons by the number of

Piece~

·cdgri~tive

d2fense mechanism differ-

of Information they seek in

decision-making situations.
Hypothesis II
Rokeach's (1960) theoretical construct of closedmindedness suggests
that the more closedminded a person is the less flexible this person will
be in revising a belief on the basis of new information.

Hypothesis II

is based on this theoretical contention and predicts that the higher
a person's D-score the less often that

pe~son

.. .decisi.on prior to making a final decision.

will change his or her

A negative relationship

between D-score and Decision Change is thus expected.

This study's

findings did not lend support to this hypothesis (see Table 2).
The same lack of relationship between D-score and pre-decisional
opinion change was reported by Taylor (1972) and Taylor and Dunnette

(1974).

,·

Several studies (Korn & Giddan, 1964; White & Alter, 1965; Pyron

& Lambert, 1967) report that closedminded persons lack flexibility, are
unable to change, are resistant to change and unaccepting of change.
However, these relationships were obtained with personality measures
rather than behaviors in decision situations and can therefore not be
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used in a direct comparison with the variables examined in

thi~

study.

Ehrlich and Lee (1969), in a review of the studies addressing
closedmindedness and change of belief, found the evidence for the theoretical construct that closedmindedness inhibits change to be sufficiently
inconclusive that they proposed an explanation suggesting that "not all
of the belief/disbelief systems will be equally open or closed. • • •
For some systems of belief and disbelief, open- and closedminded persons
will not differ in their rates of learning or change" (pp. 258-259).
Similarly, Janis and Mann (1977) suggest within the framework of
their Conflict Model of decision-making that under conditions of "unconflicted change

the dominant tendency will be

indi~ference

both supportive and non-supportive information" (p. 205).

..

toward

Since closed-

mindedness is seen as a defense mechanism, conditions of no conflict

j

would not call for defensive action.

Hence, whether D-score would be

related to Decision Change would depend on how threatening the situation
was.perceived to be.

It could possibly be argued, along with Janis and

Mann (1977) and Feger (1977), that studies conducted under relatively
4.

·'-

low-conflict conditions, such as the kind of simulated real life situations
used in this experiment, might not provoke measurable defensive decisionmaking behaviors, such as low rates of Decision Change.
In reference to the present study, however, it should also be kept
in mind that the Decision Change criterion variable was dually dependent
upon the random individual sequences experimental design and the subject
determined stopping point, and for this reason may not constitute the
best possible measure of this theoretical construct.

27
Hypothesis III
Hypothesis III stated that persons with high D-scores will report
higher Confidence estimates about the correctness of their decisions.
This contention expands upon the view of closedmindedness as a cognitive defense mechanism.

Thus, it is hypothesized, when a closedminded

person comes to an early closure of a pending decision this decision
will also be defended by being confidently·held.
support the hypothesis that
tively related.

closedminded~ess

The results fail to

and Confidence are posi-

The correlation coefficient -.18 (p_ > .05, df = 72)

across situations indicates that no significant relationship exists
(see Table 2).
Taylor (1972) and Taylor and Dunnette (1974), however, did obtain
significant positive correlations between closedmindedness and Confidence.
In.both of their studies the correlation coefficient was +.27 (p_ < .05).
The data in this study suggest a picture of a person who scores
high on the D--scale as one who, with relatively little information,
comes to a final decisien which he or she is no more and no less conf ident of than the

p~rson

with a lower D-score.

A possible explanation

for these results is made somewhat complicated because Pieces of Information, due to the combination of the "individual sequences" experimental
design and the subject determined stopping point, is not positively
correlated with Confidence (see Table 4).

It may be that a person who

is threatened by new information and tends to come to a decision more
quickly than a non-defensive person is nevertheless quite capable of
realistically evaluating his or her decision in terms of a probability
confidence estimate pertaining to this decision's accuracy.
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A post hoc reformulation of the variable Decision Accuracy into
Decision Appropriateness, (which will be discussed in more detail in
the following section) yielded a correlation coefficient of +.40
(.£. < .01, df

=

72) with D-score.

This suggests that high D-score

persons are evaluating the information they have more appropriately
than low D-score persons.

Therefore, .an appropriate evaluation of their

Confidence rather than an inflated one, as the Taylor (1972) and Taylor
and Dunnette (1974) studies suggest, app.ears plausible as well.

No

relationship was found between Confidence and Appropriateness (.!:_ = +.07,
p > .05, df = 72).
•

The picture that emerges so far depicts the person

with a high D-score,. in contrast to the person with a low D-score, as
a more efficient user of information but no different so far as the
decision criteria Decision Change and Confidence are concerned.
Hypothesis IV
~ypothesis

IV predicted that high D-score persons would tend to

make ··mer,e·.-accurate decisions than low D-score persons.

The basis for

this assertion was derived primarily from the results of the Taylor and
Dunnette (1974) study in which a statistically significant positive relationship between D-score and Decision Accuracy had been found (see Table 1).
It should be noted, however, that when intelligence was partialled out,
this correlation ceased to achieve.significance(.!:_= +.14, .P. > .05).

On

the basis of empirical findings reported by Rokeach (1960), one might
expect an equivocal finding.

Rokeach found high and low D-score persons

to be equal in their ability to analyze problems but found them to differ
........

in their ability to synthesize, with high D-score persons being less well
able to do so.

Rokeach found generally small correlations between an
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individual's ability solve the Denny Doodlebug problem and intelligence.
Rokeach addresses the problem solving process rather than the correctness
of the outcome.

In fact a person's ability to solve the problem correctly

is subsumed under the larger concept of a person's ability to synthesize
(p. 176). ·It should be kept in mind that Taylor's promotional decision
situation might not be comparable to Rokeach's problem solving task.
The findings obtained from the present study show that, across
situations, D-score and Decision

Accura~y

are not related (see Table 2).

Since several factors, as a result of the experimental design,
affected the variable Decision Accuracy, a closer look at this variable

~

i .'

and what it measures seems appropriate.
As reported earlier, the variable Diagnosticity was highly correlated with Accuracy (!:.

= +.70,

.£. < .001, df

= 72) which indicates that,

when a subject did have "good" information, the likelihood of a co.rrect
decision was considerably greater than chance.
varie~·from

Diagnosticity, however,

situation to situation so that in one situation subjects on

the average received information leading to the correct decision while
in another decision situation the average Diagnosticity led subjects to
).

the \\frong decision (see Table 6).

These discrepancies in Diagnosticity

might have been a factor influencing the number of Pieces of Information
a subject sought.
Pieces of Information themselves did not correlate with Accuracy,
the across situation correlation
(see Table 4).

coefficie~t

being -.03 (E_ > .05, df

=

72)

In light of the numerous intervening variables that could

have affected Decision Accuracy, it was decided, post hoc, to reformulate
and redefine, at least for one of the four decision situations, the
variable Decision Accuracy to reflect whether or not the decision made
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by the subject was an appropriate decision given the kind of tnformation
the subject had obtained.
Decision situation S (see Appendix A) was chosen for this purpose
because, among the four situations, it had the greatest correlation
between Diagnosticity and Accuracy (E_

= +.72,

.E. < .001, df

= 72),

and

the only statistically significant correlations between D-score and
the decision-making variables Pieces of Information and Confidence
(see Table 2).
The new Appropriateness variable is operationall¥ defined in terms
of whether the subject's judgment was based on a likelihood ratio greater
than 1.

The Unbiased Likelihood Rule was used to determine whether or

not a subject had made an appropriate decision in this situation.
A Pearson product moment correlation between Appropriateness and
D-score (situation S) resulted in an

E_ =

+.40 (.E. < .01, df = 72).

This

suggests that more dogmatic persons are more likely to make appropriate
decisions.

Unfortunately, because this study did_not include an intelli-

gence measure it is not possible to determine the extent to which intelligence may have contributed to this finding.

It is suggested that a future

study include both an· intelligence measure and an Appropriateness variable.
Two additional connnents, one having to do with differences among
the four situations used to measure decision-making behaviors and the
other having to do with differences among the three measures of openand closedmindedness, are warranted.
1.

The across-situations correlation coefficient between Diagnos-

t1city and Accuracy of +.70 (E_ < .001, df

=

72) suggests that subjects

did to a large extent perform the four tasks properly.

For situation F
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this correlation was only +.34 (.E_ < .05, df

= 72).

A test for the differ-

ence between dependent correlations showed that this correlation coefficient was significantly different from the overall correlation coef f icient of +.70 between Diagnosticity and Accuracy (!_ = 2.66, .E. < .001,
df

=

72).

Correlations for the remaining three situations ranged from

+.61 to +.72, with situation S showing the closest relationship between
Diagnosticity and Accuracy (see Table 5).
inferred that performance on the first

~ask

From this finding it may be
was impaired because it was

relatively unfamiliar.
While the data indicated that subjects were consistent both in the
!

number of Pieces of .Information they sought and in the Confidence ratings
they gave from situation to situation, they did not indicate this same
consistency for the variables Decision Change and Accuracy (see Table 4).
While the experimental design was set up, not to test a variety of
cognitive tasks represented by the four situations, but rather to test
an essentially similar cognitive task four times and while there were
statistically significant correlations across situations, it is clear
from an examination of the

situation~by-situation

correlations that

situation S (see Appendix A) contributed the bulk of the statistically
significant findings (see Table 2).

It is not clear why situation S,

more than the other situations contributed to the overall significant
relationship between D-score and Pieces of Information.

This issue

should be addressed in a future study.
2.

The Dogmatism agreement, or P-score, as predicted by Korn and

Giddan (1964) correlated very highly +.94 with the D-score.

The P-score

obtained essentially the same results as predictor of the decision making
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behaviors under examination (see Table 2).

The variations in correla-

tions affected by the P-score were not substantial enough to warrant
comparisons of its predictive abilities and that of the D-score.
The Conservatism score (C-score) failed to serve as predictor of
any of the decision-making behaviors (see Table 2).

The theoretical

construct of Conservatism, according to Nias (1973) sees the person
who scores high on the Conservatism scale as someone who would tend to
avoid making decisions, as someone who

~as

"a tendency to dislike and

avoid situations that involve a great deal of response uncertainty-need
conflict, decision-making etc." (p. 261).

It would seem plausible that

for such a person to be forced to make a decision would cause considerable
conflict, hence cognitive defense mechanisms could be expected to influence
the decision-making behavior.
The consistent pattern of very low, non-significant correlations
across all decision-making variables in each of the situations suggests
perhaps that the Conservatism scale is more of an attitude measure than
a personality·measure.

According to Janis and Mann ·(1977) "the psycho-

logical laws of opinion and attitude change are not necessarily the same
as the psychological laws of decision making • • • " {p. 5).
The predictor variables Sex and Age correlated with none of the
decision-making behaviors nor with the other predictor variables (see
'

Table 2).

An expected result that was not confii;med by the data in this study
was a sex difference for D-scores •. White and Alter (1965) found that
women had consistently scored lower throughout the studies they examined
for a surmnary report of normative information on the D-scale.

A t-test
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for differences between the independent means showed no statistically
significant difference.! = .48 (p_ > .05, df
obtained in this study by women and men.

= .87)

between the D-scores

It is possible that the

cultural changes that have taken place regarding women within the past

14 years served to eradicate.the differences White and Alter found in
1965.

White and Alter caution in their article "that the scale is highly

sensitive to subcultural differences" (p. 969).
Sl.llnnlary
Persons with high D-scores tended to arrive at decisions on the
basis of less information than persons with low D-scores (r

=

.E. ·< .05) and to make more appropriate use of information (r

= +.40,

-.22,

.E. < .01), yet they showed no tendency to differ in either accuracy
(r = +.06, .E. > .05) or confidence (r = -.18, .E. > .05).

Furthermore,

they showed no tendency to be less able to reverse an earlier decision
(r = +.04, .E. > .05).
· ",.!£N."'O-

,inter.p:r~e.itat;l:0ns---ef

sive, suggest themselves.

this pattern of results, not mutually exclut"'"

First, it is quite possible that the effective

variable distinguishing high and low D-score persons in this study was
intelligence, rather than dogmatism.

There is evidence (Taylor & Dunnette,

1974) that the D-score reflects both intelligence and dogmatism.

There

is also evidence (Janis & Mann, 1977) to suggest that awareness of the
possibility -0f serious losses is a necessary condition for the expression
of defensive avoidance; and it is not difficult to imagine that the decis~on

situations employed in the present study failed to provide this

necessary condition for activating dogmatic behaviors predictable from
the D-score, thus leaving the D-score with only intelligence to predict •

.

-

,
l
1

34
The picture of a person who makes efficient use of information in arriving
at decisions is certainly close to that of a person high in general intelligence.

One prediction from this interpretation is

intelligence would reduce the correlations between

tha~

partialling out

D~score

and both

Pieces of Information and Appropriateness to zero.
A second interpretation is also possible, that the effective variable distinguishing high and low D-score persons in this study was dogmatism, after all, and that more dogmatic.persons are, in some situations,
at least, indeed more effective decision makers than less dogmatic
persons.

There is evidence that more dogmatic, or authoritarian, persons

tend to be more anxious and concerned about possible negative consequences
(Adorno et al., 1950) than less dogmatic, or authoritarian, persons; and
there is evidence (Janis & Mann, 1977) to suggest that enhanced awareness of possible negative consequences improves decision quality.

These

two facts, taken by themselves, would lead one to expect more dogmatic
persons to make better decisions, reversing the negative picture of
dogmatic persons painted by Rokeach (1960) and Long and Ziller (1965).

An additional fact, however, suggests that, even if this much is
granted, a qualification may be in order.

The well-supported (see Anderson,

1975, p. 155) Yerkes-Dodson law states that problem-solving performance
is at its best at an intermediate, rather than at an extremely high or
extremely low, level of motivation or conflict.
that more dogmatic persons

br~ng

It is quite possible

enough motivation, conflict, or anxiety

to the situation to put themselves nearer the optimum in low-conflict
situations, where they would outperform less dogmatic persons, yet push
them beyond the optimum in high-conflict situations, where they would

.A
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then perform less well than less dogmatic persons.

One prediction from

this interpretation is that increasing the level of situation-induced
motivation, conflict, or anxiety would initially reduce the correlations
between D-score and both Pieces of Information and Appropriateness to
zero and eventually reverse their direction.

~.,.;,p""--.,;
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Table 1
Comparison Figures (Correlations) Between Results of This Study
And Those of Other Authors' Correlations Between
Dogmatism and Pieces of Information etc.
Authors

Variables
Long & Ziller

(1965)

Taylor
(1972)

Taylor &
Dunnette

Jolin

(1979)

(1974)

Pieces of
Information

Dogmatism

Dogmatism

Dogmatism

Dogmatism
Total
Sit. S

-.20* to
-.32**

-.17

-.16

-.22*

-.29*

Decision
Change

x

-.10

-.09

+.04

-.11

Accuracy

x

+.23*

+.23*

+.06

+.07

Confidence

x

+.27*

+.27*

-.18

-.29**

* = p <. 05
** = p <. 01

+.01

+.06

+.07

Conservatism
C-score

Age

Sex

**

F

+.18

-.01

-.03

+.04

-.03

.,, p < .05
p <.01
N = 74

-.17

Dogmatism
P-score

*

-.22

Dogmatism
D-score

Total

df

= 72

+.02 -.001

+.09

-.07

+.03

+.01
+.09

-.01

-.07

-.01

c

-.01

+.19

+.14

F

Decision
Change

+.06

-.09

+.08

+.04

-.01

B

+.08

-.08

-.17

-.09

-.11

s

+.03

+.07

-.15

*

-.24

-.18

Total

F = Decision Situation F
C = Decision Situation C
B = Decision Situation B
S = Decision Situation S
Total = The across situations correlation

+.01

-.06

+.07

+.04

Total

+.21 +.001 -.001

*

-.24

**

-.29

s

-.03

+.17

-.18

-.17

B

-.15

+.06

-.16

-.19

c

Pieces of
Information

-.07

+.12

-.13

-.08

-.03

F

+.08

-.08

-.03

-.01

+.02

c
B

-.05

-.03

-.15

-.21

-.18

Decision
Confidence

Correlations Between Independent and Dependent Variables

Table 2

+.11

+.12

-.12

**

-.35

**

-.29

s

+.05

-.07

-.OS
-.03

-.08

-.04

-~01

F

+.16

+.01

+.06

Total

-.12

+. 02 +. 002

+.15
-.11 .-.09

+.03

+.07

s

+.05

-.05

-.06

B

+.12
+.20

+.07

+.11

c

. Decision
Accuracy

w

"'-J
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Table 3
Results of a Test for Significance Between
Criterion Correlations
Dogmatism/
Opinion Change

Dogmatism/
Confidence

Dogmatism/
Accuracy

Situations

Dogmatism/
Pieces of Inform.

F and C

1.06

.83

.06

.63

F and B

.91

.83

.99

.31

F and S

1.88

.19

1.88

.37

C and B

.12

.00

1.06

.31

C and S

.67

.63

1. 97*

.24

B and S

.81

.63

.74

.06

the Y.alues in.this table are t values
df = 72

N = 74

*=

p <.05

Accuracy

Confidence

Change

Decision

Information

of

Amount

'"<**

*
**

s

B

c

F

Total

s

B

c

F

Total

s

B

c

F

Total

s

B

c

F

Total

r

72

<.001

< .05
<. 01

<l( =

p
p

-.03

-.20

c
B

s

+. 35**

+.14

-. 40>''**
-.02

+.39**

-.07

-. 35**'"

-.10

-.02

+.59***
+.24*

1. 00
+. 28* 1. 00
+.33* +.60***1.00
+.08 +.65***+.75***1.00

F

+.02

+. 38**

1.00

Total

Amount of Information

+.16

-.07

1.00

Total

+.03

-.36**

1. 00
+.08
-.19
-.21

F

+.28*

-.08

1.00
+.21
+.02

c

-.04

:-.32**

-.18

1. 00

B

Decision Change

+.04

+.13

1. 00

s

+.07

.. 1. 00

Total

Decision Task Characteristics (Correlations)

Table 4

c
B

s

+.26*
-.09
+.10
+.11

1. 00
+. 60** 1<1. 00
+. 37>~ +. 44***1. 00
+.43** +.33** +.28* 1.00

F

Confidence

1.00

Total

c

1. 00
-.003 1. 00
-.33** -.02
-.05
-.15

F

Accurac:t

s

\.0

w

+. 50 l.CD

1.00

!)
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Table 5
Correlations Between Diagnosticity
and Decision Variables
Diagnosticity
Total
Pieces of Information

Total

F

c

+.16

c

-.03
-.20

B

s

-.43***

Total

+.04
-.10

F

c

..... 05
-.20

B

s
Confidence

-.09

Total

+.16
-.02

F

c

+.13
+.06

B

s
Accuracy

+.09

Total

+.70***
+.34**

F

c

+.61***
+.71***
+. 72***

B

s

*
**
***
N
df

= p <.05
= p <.01
= p <.001

= 74
= 72

Total
F

c
B

s

s

-.16

F

Decision Change

B

= Across situations
= situation F
=

situation C
B
situation S

= situation
=

correlation
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Table 6
Distributional Statistics for Predictor
and Criterion Variables

Pieces
of·
Information

Variable

Mean

SD

Age

25.26

6.34

n/a

·22. 73 116

137. 50

81-213

40-280

17

15.93

4-36

0-40

C-score

36.35

10.63

24

36.50

14-61

0-100

Total

23.53

7.09

13

23

13-40

12-40

s

6.73
5.23
5.37
6.20

2.66
1.91
2.22
2.59

10
3
3
3

6.83
5. 07·
4.93
6.10

3-10
3-10
3-10
3-10

3-10
3-10
3-10
3-10

Total

1.47

1.48

0.0

1. 25

0-6

0-32

.so

.94
.57
1.01
.55

o.o

.30
.47
.20

.21
.15
.15
.08

0-4
0-2
0-4
0-2

0-8
0-8
0-8
0-8

3.49

.41

3.50

3.52

2-4

2-4

c

.84
.87

B

.87
.89

.16
.10
.10
.19

.90
.90
.80
.90

.89
.90
. 87
.92

Total

6.57

1.04

6.00

6.60

4-8

F

1. 73 ..
1.57
1.83
1.43

.45
.50
.38
.50

2.00
2.00
2.00
1. 00

1.82
1. 62
1. 90
1.38

1-2
1-2
1-2
1-2

43. 77

5.10

41.00

43.50

36-56

0-80

12.5
10.67
11. 83
8. 77

2.19
2.23
2.37
3.26

13. 00
10.00
11.00
7.00

12.75
10.50
12.00
8.83

8-18
7-16
6-15
2-15

0-20
0-20
0-20
0-20

F

c
B

F·

s

c
.B

s
Total
Diagnosticity F

c

B

s
74

15-49

5.27

Total

=

23.32

15.78

B

N

23

P-score

·s

Accuracy

Range

137 .10

c

Conf id-ence-

Median

D-score

F

Decision
Change

Absolute Range

Mode

0.0

o.o
0.0

• 5-1. 0
. 6-1. 0
. 7-1. 0
• 5-1. 0

.5-1.0
.5-1. 0
• 5-1. 0
. 5-1. 0
4 = none correct
8 = all correct
1 = one correct
2 = two correct
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Table 7
Correlations Between Predictor Variables
Dogmatism
D-score
1)-score

Conservatism ~
C-score

P-score

1.00

P-score

+ . 94***

C-score

+ .22*

+ .13

1.00

Age

- .12

- .14

- .04

1.00

Sex

+ .08

+ .12

+ .15

- .05

*'= p <.05
** = p <.01
*** = p <.001

Sex

1.00

N

=

74

df = 72

1.00
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PLEASE PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:
Age

Sex

--- Sophomore

Freshman

Major in College

~-~~~--~~-~~-~~~

Junior

---

Senior

Other

---

INSTRUCTIONS:
Each of you will receive four different decision situations, it is
your task to come to a decision in each of the four situations.
First you will be asked to indicate which of the two alternatives
you would choose.
Secondly, you will be asked whether the choice you made represents
a PRELIMINARY or a FINAL DECISION
-if your choice represents a PRELIMINARY DECISION you may
go on to obtain·the next piece of information pertinent
to your decision situation.
-if your choice represents a FINAL DECISION, you may
regard this particular decision task as completed.
All that will remain for you to do before you may proceed
to the next task will be to indicate on the scale how
certa1n you are that the decision you have just made is correct.
Please read all the information carefully and mark your answers
clearly. Please do not skip parts of the task for it makes
evaluation of your effort difficult.
Thank you for your participation.
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DECISION SITUATION F
You have been a casual gambler for several years, and you have acquired
the reputation of being unbeatable at your particular game. Your success
is due to your highly developed skill of assessing odds and knowing when
to quit. One day you are challenged publicly by a person who says he
can beat you at your own game--at assessing odds and knowing when to quit.
You accept the challenge, which you agree to carry out in front of your
gambling companions. You and your opponent have agreed to b.et $1,000.00
on the following game:
You have two bookbags each with 100 poker chips.
BAG I has 70 RED chips and 30 BLUE chips.
BAG II has 30 RED chips and 70 BLUE chips.
Below are shown some chips which were drawn from one of the two bags.
YOU ARE TO DECIDE WHETHER THEY WERE DRAWN FROM BAG I OR BAG II.
You will be given an opportunity to get additional pieces of information,
the winner will be the one who has the correct answer with the fewest
pieces of information.
At this point please answer:
1.

Are the three chips at the left most likely to have come
from (circle your choice)
BAG I
BAG II
-please indicate on the scale how certain you are that
this· decision is correct:

.5

l

uncertain

.6

l

.7

I

.8

l

.9

l

1.00

l

completely certain

2.

If this is only a PRELIMINARY DECISION and you want more
information, check the box on the left, skip step 3,
remove the next dot, and go on to step 4.

3.

If this is your FINAL DECISION, please check box: I
You have now completed decision SITUATION F. Turn
this set of pages face down and go on to the next
decision situation.

I
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4.

Are the four chips so far most likely to have come
BAG I
BAG II
from (circle your choice)
-indicate certainty on scale:
.5

I

uncertain

.6

I

.7

I

.8

I

.9

I

LOO

I

completely certain

5.

PRELIMINARY DECISION: check box; skip step 6,
remove next dot and go on to step 7.

6.

FINAL DECISION: check box: ,~-/
and move on to next.DECISION S~TUATION.

7.

Are the five chips so far most likely to have come
from (circle your choice)
BAG I
BAG II
-indicate

.5

I

uncertain

ce~tainty

.6

I

.7

I

on scale:
.8

I

.9

1.00

I

I

completely certain

8.

PRELIMINARY DECISION: check box, skip step 9,
remove next dot and go on to step 10.

9.

FINAL DECISION: check box: / /
and .move on to next DECISION SITUATION

. ··J.-0 ..... Are the six chips so. far most likely to have come

from (circle your choice)

BAG I

BAG II

-indicate certainty on scale:

.5

I

uncertain

.6

I

•7

I

.8

I

.9

I

1.00

I

completely certain

11.

PRELIMINARY DECISION: check box, skip step 12,
remove next dot and ··go on to step 13.

12.

FINAL DECISION: check box: / /
and move on to next DECISION SITUATION.

13.

Are the seven chips so far most likely to have come from
(circle your choice)
BAG I
BAG II
-indicate certainty on scale:

.5

I

uncertain

.6

I

.7

I

.8

.9

I

I

1.00

I

completely certain
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14.

PRELIMINARY .DECISION; check box, .skip
remove next dot and go on to st~p 16.

15.

FINAL DECISION: check box: / i
and move on to next DECISION SITUATION.

16.

Are the eight chips so far most likely to have
come from (circle your choice)
BAG I
BAG II

st~p

15,

-indicate certainty on scale:

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9

I

I

I

I

I

uncertain

. 1.00

I

completely certain

17.

PRELIMINARY DECISION: check box, skip step 18,
remove next dot and go on to step 19.

18.

FINAL DECISION: check box: / /
and move on to next DECISION SITUATION.

19.

Are the nine chips so far most likely to have
come from (circle your choice)
BAG I
BAG II
-indicate certainty on scale:

.5

I

uncertain

.6

I

.7
1

.8

I

.9

I

1. 00

I

completely certain

20.

PRELIMINARY DECISION: check box, skip step 21,
remove next dot and go on to step 22.

21.

FINAL DECISION: check box: / /
and move on to next DECISION SITUATION.

22.

Are the ten chips so far most likely to have come
BAG I
BAG II
from (circle your choice)
-indicate certainty on scale:

.5

.6

I

I

uncertain

;

I

.

.7

.8

I

I

.9

I

LOO

I

completely certain

I

I

23.

PRELIMINARY DECISION:

24.

FINAL DECISION: check box: / /
and move on to next DECISION SITUATION.

check box:
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DECISION SITUATION C
The company you work for offers a six-months decision-making training
course to selected employees. Completion of this training would assure
you of a much more satisfying position than the one you currently hold
and would mean a salary increase of $5000.00 per year.
The following simple screening device is used as the basis for selection.
You will be admitted if, in the decision situation below, you have come
to a correct decision using the least number of additional pieces of
information.

In this situation you have two basketbali teams.
TEAM I makes baskets from the free-throw line 80% of the time.
TEAM II makes baskets from the free-throw line 50% of the time.
Below is a series of random attempts from the free-throw line.
YOU ARE TO DECIDE WHETHER THESE SHOTS WERE MOST LIKELY TO HAVE
BEEN MADE BY TEAM I OR TE.AM II.
(+) indicates a successful shot

(-) indicates an unsuccessful shot
At this point please answer:
1. Are the three shots at the left most likely to have
come from (circle your choice)
TEAM I
TEAM II
-please indicate on the scale how certain you are
that this decision is correct

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9

I

1·

I

I

I

uncertain
2.

1.00

I

completely certain

If this is only a PRELIMINARY DECISION and you want
more information, check the box on the left, skip step 3,
remove the next dot, and go on to step 4 •

.

3.

If this is your FINAL DECISION, PLEASE check box:
You have now completed DECISION SITUATION C.
Turn this set of pages face down and go on to the
next decision situation.

,.,,. ....

-

/

/
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'

4.

1·
l

Are the four shots so far most likely to have come from
TEAM I
(circle your choice)
TEAM II
-indicate certainty on scale:
.5

I

uncertain

.6

.7

.8

I

I

I

.9

I

1.00

I

completely certain

5.

PRELIMINARY DECISION: check box, skip step 6,
remove next dot and go on to step 7.

6.

FINAL DECISION: check box: / /
and move on to next DECISION SITUATION.

7.

Are the five shots so far most likely to have
come from (circle your choice)
TEAM I
TEAM II
-indicate certainty on scale:
.5

.6

I

I

uncertain

.7

l

.8

.9

I

I

1.00

I

completely certain

8.

PRELIMINARY DECISION: check box, skip step 9,
remove next dot and go on to step 10.

9.

FINAL DECISION: check box: / /
and move on to next DECISION SITUATION.

10.

Are the six shots so far most likely to have come
from (circle your choice)
TEAM I
TEAM II
-indicate certainty on scale:
.5

I

uncertain

.6

I

•7 .

I

.9

.8

I

I

1.00

I

completely certain

11.

PRELIMINARY DECISION: check box, skip step 12,
remove next dot and go on to step 13.

12.

FINAL DECISION: check box: / /
and move on to next DECISION SITUATION •

.t"'~·

...
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13.

Are the seven shots so far most likely to have come
from (circle your choice)
TEAM I
TEAM II
-indicate certainty on scale:
.5

I

.6

l

.7

.8

I

1

.9

1.00

l

I
completely certain

uncertain
14.

PRELIMINARY DECISION: check box, skip step 15,
remove next dot and go on to st~p 16.

15.

FINAL DECISION: check box:
and move on to next DECISION SITUATION.

16.

Are the eight shots so far most likely to have come
from (circle your choice)
TEAM I
TEAM II
-indicate certainty on scale:
.5

I

uncertain
17.

.6

I

.8

.7

I

I

.9

l

1.00

I

completely certain

PRELIMINARY DECISION: check box, skip step 18,
remove next dot and go on to step 19.

: ·~...

~18.

19.

FINAL DECISION: check box: _/_/
and move on to next DECISION SITUATION.
Are the nine shots so far most likely to have come
from (circle your choice)
TEAM I
TEAM II
-indicate certainty on scale:

.·

.5

I

uncertain

.6

I

.7

I

.8

l

.9

I

1.00

l

completely certain

20.

PRELIMINARY DECISION: check box, skip step 21,
remove next dot and go on to step 22.

21.

FINAL DECISION: check box: / /
and move on to next DECISION SITUATION.

1

I
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I
22.

Are the ten shots so far most likely to have come
from (circle your choice)
TEAM I
TEAM II
-indicate certainty on scale:
.5

I

uncertain

l

;

f .

.6

I

.7

I

.8

.9

I

I

check box:

1.00

I

completely certain

I

I

23.

PRELIMINARY DECISION:

24.

FINAL DECISION: check box: / /
and move on to next DECISION SITUATION.
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DECISION SITUATION B
You are being tried out for a new position on a commercial fishing vessel.
Your job is to determine whether schools of fish you encounter are or

are not profitable to fish.

~

1·

In order to make the correct decision, you

cast a line and examine your catch for size. It is important both for
you to make correct decisions and to make them on the basis of as few
casts as possible. You are aware that, in order to get this interesting
and well-paid position, you will ·be able to make only an occasional mistake.

I

Your radar has just picked up a school of fish in the vicinity of your
boat. The fish in this area come in two types, which differ only in
size. 60% of the fish of Type I are above the legal minimum size, while
_pnly 30% of those of Type II are above the minimum. Type I is profitable
to fish, while Type II is not.
Below are the results from the first few casts.
(+) indicates a fish above legal minimum size

(-) indicates a fish below legal minimum size

At this point answer:
1. Are the three fish at the left most likely to have come
from (circle your choice)
PROFITABLE SCHOOL
NON-PROFITABLE SCHOOL
~

.

Please indicate on the scale how certain you
·are that this decision is correct:

.5

·l

-uncertain

.6

l

.7

I

.8

I

.9

l

1.00

I

completely certain

2.

If this is only a PRELIMINARY DECISION and you want
more information, check the box on the left, skip step 3,
remove the next dot, and go on to step 4.

3.

If this is your FINAL DECISION, please check this box:
You have now completed DECISION SITUATION B. Turn
this set of pages face down and go on to the next
decision situation.

4.

Are the four fish so far most likely to have come
from (circle your choice)
PROFITABLE SCHOOL
NON-PROFITABLE SCHOOL
-indicate certainty on scale.

.5

I

uncertain

.6

I

.7

I

•8

I

.9

I

1.00

I

completely certain

I

I
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5.

PRELIMINARY DECISION: check box, skip step 6,
remove next dot and move on to step 7.

6.

FINAL DECISION: check box: / /
and move on to next DECISION SITUATION.

7.

Are the five fish so far most likely to have come
PROFITABLE SCHOOL
from the (circle your choice)
NON-PROFITABLE SCHOOL

I
i

!
!
J

!

r

-indicate certainty on scale:

.s
I

uncertain

.• 6

I

.7

I

.8

.9

I

I

1.00

I

completely certain

8.

PRELIMINARY DECISION: check box, skip step 9,
remove next dot and go on to step 10.

9.

FINAL DECISION: CHECK BOX: / /
and move on to next DECISION SITUATION.

10.

Are the six fish so far most likely to have come
from the (circle yQur choice)
PROFITABLE SCHOOL
NON-PROFITABLE SCHOOL
-indicate.certainty on scale:
.5

I

uncertain

.6

I

.7

l

.8

l

1.00

.9

I

f

completely certain

11.

PRELIMINARY DECISION: check box, skip step 12,
remove next dot and go on to step 13.

12.

FINAL DECISION: check box: / /
and move on to next DECISION SITUATION.

13.

Are the seven fish so far most likely to have come
from the (circle your choice)
PROFITABLE SCHOOL
NON-PROFITABLE SCHOOL
-indicate certainty on scale:

.s
I

uncertain

14.

.6

I

•7

I

.8

I

.9

I

1.00

I

completely certain

PRELIMINARY DECISION: check box, skip step 15;
remove next dot and go on to step 16.
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15.

FINAL DECISION: check box: ./ /
and move on to next DECISION SITUATION.

16.

Are the eight fish so far most likely to have come
from the (circle your choice)
PROFITABLE SCHOOL
NON-PROFITABLE SCHOOL
-indicate certainty on scale:
.5

I

uncertain·

.6

.7

.8

I

I

I

.9

I

1.00

I

completely certain

17.

PRELIMINARY DECISION: ·Check b~x, skip step 18,
remove next dot and go on to step 19.

18.

FINAL DECISION: check box: / /
and move on to next DECISION SITUATION.

19.

Are the nine fish so far most likely to have come
from the (circle your choice)
PROFITABLE SCHOOL
NON-PROFITABLE SCHOOL
-indicate certainty on scale:
.5

l

uncertain

.6

l

.7

l

.8

I

.9

1.00

I

l

completely certain

20.

PRELIMINARY DECISION: check box, skip step 21, remove
next dot and go on to step 22.

21.

FINAL DECISION: check box: / /
and move on to next DECISION SITUATION.

22.

Are the ten fish so far most likely to have come
from the (circle your choice)
PROFITABLE SCHOOL
NON-PROFITABLE SCHOOL
-indicate certainty on scale:
"
.5
.6
.8
•7

I

uncertain

I

I

I

.9

1.00

I

I

completely certain

23.

PRELIMINARY DECISION:

24.

FINAL DECISION: check box: / /
and move on to next DECISION SITUATION.

check box:

I

I

.,
;,.
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DECISION SITUATION S
You are a buyer for a ·large department store. Your assignment is to
buy ten thousand pairs of Italian shoes. A regional wholesaler has
announced a very good deal on a shipment ·of Piazzo shoes. From your
prior experience you know, however, that there are two Italian firms
producing shoes under that name. One of these manufacturers produces
a slightly defective shoe, which fails to meet your company's high standards about 20% of the time. The other manufacturer produces such a
slightly defective shoe about 40% of the time. You ask the wholesaler to
let you examine the shipment. Reluctantly, the wholesaler agrees to let
you examine a number of randomly selected pairs of shoes. The whole_saler pressures you to hurry up, for other bidders are waiting in line
to snap up what to them looks like a grea't deal.
If you get the shoes that are only about 20% defective your firm will
realize an innnediate profit of $5,000.00. If you get the shoes that are
about 40% defective, however, your firm will lose $5,000.00 and your
reputation will be diminished.
Below are the results of a random sampling of shoes.
(+) indicates an acceptable shoe
(-) indicates an unacceptable shoe
.~.

At this point please answer:
.
1. Are the three samples at the left most likely to have
come from the (c~rcle your choice) PROFITABLE
NON-PROFITABLE
SHIPMENT
-please indicate on the scale how certain you are
that this decision is correct

.5

I

uncertain

r!

.6

1

.7

I

.8

I

.9

I

1.00

I

completely certain

2.

If this is only a PRELIMINARY DECISION and you want more
information, check the box on the left, skip step 3, remove
the dot and go on to step 4.

3.

If this is your FINAL DECISION, please check this box: / /
You have now completed DECISION SITUATION S. Turn this
set of pages face down and go on to the next decision situation.

I
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4.
~

I
1·

Are the four samples so far most likely to have come
from (circle your choice)
PROFITABLE
NON-PROFITABLE
SHIPMENT
-indicate certainty on scale:

.5

I

uncertain

.6

.7

.8

I

I

I

.9

I

LOO

I

completely certain

5.

PRELIMINARY DECISION: check box, skip step 6, remove
next dot and go on to step 7.

6.

FINAL DECISION: check box: / /
and move on to next DECISION SITUATION

7.

Are the five samples so far most likely to have come
from the (circle your choice)
PROFITABLE
NON-PROFITABLE
SHIPMENT
-indicate certainty on scale:
.5

.6

I

I

uncertain

.7

I

.8

I

I

1.00

.9

I

completely certain

8.

PRELIMINARY DECISION: check-box, skip step 9, remove
next dot and go on to step 10.

9.

FINAL DECISION: check box: / /
and move on to next DECISION SITUATION

10.

Are the six samples so far most likely to have come
from the (circle your choice)
PROFITABLE
NON-PROFITABLE
SHIPMENT
indicate certainty on scale:

.5

I

!

uncertain

r
l

.6

I

.7

.8

I

I

.9

I

1.00

I

completely certain

11.

PRELIMINARY DECISION: check box, skip step 12,
remove next dot and go on to step 13.

12.

FINAL DECISION: check box: / /
and move on to next DECISION SITUATION

13.

Are the seven samples so far most likely to have come
from the (circle your choice)
PROFITABLE
NON-PROFITABLE
SHIPMENT
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-indicate certainty on scale:

.5

l

uncertain

.6

.7

I

1

.8

l

.9

I

1.00

I

completely certain

14.

PRELIMINARY DECISION: check box, skip step 15,
remove next dot and go on to step 16.

15.

FINAL DECISION: check box: / /
and move on to next DECISION SITUATION

16.

Are the eight samples so far most likely to have come
PROFITABLE
NON-PROFITABLE
from the (circle your choice)
SHIPMENT
-indicate certainty on scale

.5

1

uncertain

.6

l

.7

I

.8

.9

I

I

1.00

I

completely certain

17.

PRELIMINARY DECISION: check box, skip step 18,
remove next dot, and go on to step 19.

18.

FINAL DECISION: check box: / /
and move on to next DECISION SITUATION.

·19·. Are the nine samples so far most likely to have come
PROFITABLE
NON-PROFITABLE
, ·'-.~from ,.th:e (cd:~c-1-e. -y.our .choice)
SHIPMENT

-indicate certainty on scale:
.5

.6

l

I

uncertain

I
1.

.7

l

.8

l

.9

I

1.00

I

completely certain

20.

PRELIMINARY DECISION: check box, skip step 21,
remove next dot, ana go on to step 22.

21.

FINAL DECISION: check box: / /
and move on to next DECISION SITUATION.
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22.

Are the ten samples so far most likely to have come ·.
from the (circle your choice)
PROFITABLE
NON-PROFITABLE
SHIPMENT
-indicate certainty on scale:
.5

I

uncertain

''

I
l,.

.6

I

•7

I

.8

.9

I

I

check box:

1.00

I

completely certain

I

I

23.

PRELIMINARY DECISION:

24.

FINAL DECISION: check box: / /
and move on to next DECISION SITUATION.

I

L

-----,
I

·-~··

•. T

~--~.-~-~$"T -~-·~
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-
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>
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APPENDIX B
List of Dogmatism Scale Items That Were
Changed to Reflect Non-Sexist
Rather Than Sexist Language
Item 11:

Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.

Changed to:
..Item

25:

A person on his own is a helpless and miserable creature •

"While T don't like to admit thi.s even to myself, my secret
ambition is to become a great man, like Einstein, or Beethoven,
or Shakespeare.

Changed to:

While I don't like to admit this even to myself, my secret

ambition is to become a great person, like Einstein, or
Beethoven, or Shakespeare.
Item 35:

In the history of mankind there have probably been just a
handful of really great thinkers.

Changed to:

In the history of humanity there have probably been just

a handful of really great thinkers.
Item 37:

A man who does not believe in some great cause has not really
lived.

Changed to:

A person who does not believe in some great cause has

not really lived.

